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AN INVESTIGATION OF CRIMINAL FACE BIAS IN THE INNOCENCE PROJECT CASES

by

AMANDA M. CLEVINGER

Under the Direction of Heather Kleider-Offutt, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT
Eyewitness memory error is the most frequent cause of wrongful conviction in the United
States (The Innocence Project, 2008). Many studies have investigated causes of these misidentifications such as type of questioning, lineup presentation, and witness instructions, all which can
be controlled by police procedure or laws (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006). Other factors outside the control of the legal system, such as crime scene context, duration of the crime, and individual differences among individuals involved may also have effects on sentencing.
Research shows that risk for misidentification is high when an innocent suspect in a
lineup looks more salient to an eyewitness than do other lineup members (Flowe & Humphries,
2011). One way in which a suspect may appear more salient in a lineup is if they possess facial
features that reflect the criminal stereotype: scars, pockmarks, tattoos, long, dark, shaggy hair,
prominent jaw (MacLin & Herrera, 2006; Reed & Reed, 1973). Research shows that facial ap-

pearance is not an accurate reflection of character, yet individuals continue to make character
judgments based on facial features and that these judgments influence decision making (Brandt,
1980; Fiske, 1998). In the current study, I investigate the use of the criminal face stereotype in a
sample of misidentified and convicted persons from the court cases indexed in the Innocence
Project on-line database.
Research shows that face perception is not only a function of the face being viewed, but
also of the individual perceiving the face (Hehman et al., 2017). In the current study, I test
whether there are systematic differences in the perception of trait characteristics criminality,
trustworthiness, and dominance as a function of conviction status (perpetrator, exonerate, filler)
and features of the target face. Another factor that may affect perception is the cross-race effect
(Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). The current study examines differences in facial ratings for crossrace versus same-race judgments.
Further, how perceiver characteristics relate to character judgments of others have not
been fully explored. The current study will investigate whether characteristics of the perceiver,
including interracial anxiety, previous victimization, and fear of future victimization are associated with facial ratings of trait impressions. These characteristics of the perceiver may be related
to face judgments that pertain to an eyewitness context.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Eyewitnesses to a crime are often called upon to assist police in the identification of possible perpetrators. Research shows that factors such as poor viewing conditions at the crime,
weak memory for the perpetrator’s face, and racial differences between the witness and the perpetrator all impact memory performance with the result of making accurate lineup identification
difficult (Brewer & Wells, 2011). Other factors can bias witnesses towards choosing individuals
whom the police suspect to be perpetrators. For example, when the physical appearance of the
suspect differs from that of other lineup members, witnesses’ attention is drawn to the suspect,
making a misidentification more likely (Flowe & Humphries, 2011). This difference in appearance can put a person at a greater risk for misidentification, as that individual “stands out” from
the other lineup members. Such bias is of particular concern if the suspect in the lineup is actually innocent (Brewer & Wells, 2011).
A large body of research has investigated how individual differences in appearance
among people in a lineup can influence identification accuracy. For instance, evidence confirms
the importance of matching lineup members for such characteristics as gender, race, height, and
weight (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011). However, other potential effects of appearance, such as
the possibility that specific facial features may increase an individual’s prominence within the
lineup or their risk for being selected out of a lineup, have not been rigorously studied. Of particular concern to lineup decisions are feature-based judgments related to purported criminal appearance. Given that people commonly stereotype some faces as “criminal-looking” (Bull, 1992;
MacLin & Herrera, 2006; Shoemaker, South, & Lowe, 1973), it is important that we understand
whether and how the use of this facial stereotype may affect eyewitness identification.
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Furthermore, research on person perception suggests that judgments made about other individuals are not only a function of target characteristics, but are also highly influenced by characteristics of the perceiver (Hehman et al., 2017). Thus, individuals may vary in their likelihood
of using the criminal face stereotype as a function of personal characteristics or experience, such
as whether they have been a victim of a violent crime in the past, have anxiety about violent
crime, or have anxiety about interracial contact. Published studies to date, however, have not
fully explored whether and how perceiver characteristics relate to eyewitness identification decisions in the context of police lineups. Research aimed at clarifying ways in which individual differences among eyewitnesses themselves may be associated with how they perceive faces and
subsequently make decisions about them would enhance our current knowledge of eyewitness
memory and decision-making in a legal context.
1.1

Purpose of the Study
In the current paper, I evaluate the strength of association between ratings of criminality

and possession of facial characteristics stereotypically associated with criminality. In addition, I
examine, using archival data from the Innocence Project, if rated criminality varies according to
whether the target was an actual perpetrator; was convicted of a crime, but later exonerated; or
has no known history of involvement with the criminal justice system. Also, I examine whether
rated criminality varies as a function of the race match between the target face and the perceiver
(rater). I also examine whether rater characteristics, including past exposure to violent crime,
anxiety about violent crime, and anxiety about interracial contact, influence perceived criminality. This work will inform several gaps in the literature. Specifically, the bulk of previous research on face perception has been conducted using photos from actor databases, volunteers, or
computer generated faces (e.g., Funk, Walker, & Todorov, 2017; Hehman, Flake, & Freeman,
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2015; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). The current study uses images of actual convicted persons
as stimuli. Further, this is the only study known to the author to directly compare exonerates and
perpetrators. Also, this is one of only a few studies to examine face perception as a function of
both the target and perceiver. To support my investigation, I review information on eyewitness
memory and lineup procedure, first impressions, stereotypes and their consequences, the crossrace effect, and how perception may be altered by experience.
1.2

Eyewitness Memory
The reliability of eyewitness memory has been questioned as far back as 1908, in Hugo

Munsterberg’s seminal book, On the Witness Stand: Essays on Psychology and Crime. To corroborate Munsterberg’s suspicions, law professor Edwin Borchard documented 65 cases of eyewitness error and discussed them in his 1932 book, Convicting the Innocent. Further, in the 1967
court case of United States v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the shortcomings of eyewitness memory and suggested that cases of mistaken identification were quite common.
Despite these early warnings, psychological research on eyewitness memory and identification did not start in earnest until the 1970s. This body of more recent work has yielded support
for earlier claims that eyewitness memory is fallible and can be shaped by factors such as eyewitness biases, stereotypes, emotion, and experience (Loftus, 2005; Wixted, 2004). However, it
was only with the advent of DNA testing in the 1990s, and, as a result, DNA exonerations, that
the criminal justice system began to take this work on eyewitness identification seriously (Wells
& Olson, 2003).
Although eyewitness memory has been repeatedly shown to be unreliable, eyewitnesses
often provide the only evidence available in a case (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981). In fact,
it is estimated that eyewitness evidence plays a role in over 75,000 cases per year in North Amer-
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ica (Goldstein, Chance, & Schneller, 1989). Despite its demonstrated unreliability, eyewitness
testimony is powerful in court and is often convincing to judges and jurors, especially when the
witness appears highly confident (Magnussen et al., 2010; Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981;
Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979).
Most commonly, investigations into eyewitness misidentification distinguish between
two sources of potential error (Wells, 1978). Some of these potential errors constitute system
variables, in that they can be controlled by police procedure or laws and include type and number
of lineup presentations (Steblay et al., 2003), witness instructions (Wells, 1978; Wells, Memon,
& Penrod, 2006), and how physically similar the fillers (known innocent lineup members) are to
the suspect (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011; Fitzgerald et al., 2013; Lindsay & Wells, 1980;
Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 1993).
Other sources of error lie outside the control of the legal system; these estimator variables
include factors that are specific to the circumstances of the crime, such as viewing conditions at
the crime, the duration of the crime, type of crime, whether a weapon was used, and eyewitness
stress level (Wells, 1978). They also encompass individual characteristics of the people involved, like perpetrator and witness race, age, and gender.
These two types of factors interact with one another to influence judgments during lineup
procedures administered by police officers. In the United States, a traditional lineup procedure
involves the simultaneous presentation of six individuals, either live or in photos. One of these
six individuals is the suspect, who may be guilty or innocent; the remaining five are fillers—foils
who are known to be innocent (Wixted et al., 2016). Police create lineups by selecting fillers
whose general features of appearance, such as gender, race, height, and weight match the witnesses’ description of the suspect (Wixted et al., 2016).
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The greatest risk for misidentification comes when the real perpetrator is not in the
lineup, and thus the suspect in the lineup is innocent (Well, 1984). Witnesses often assume that
the perpetrator is in the lineup and will try to make an identification of someone, even when they
do not recognize any faces (Brewer & Wells, 2006). This assumption increases witnesses’ tendency to make relative judgments, in which they compare lineup members to each other, rather
than to their memory of the perpetrator, and engage in various reasoning processes in order to
figure out who the suspect is (Wells, 1984). This type of reasoning or comparison can be particularly problematic when the innocent suspect is salient in some way and thus may encourage
their misidentification. The tendency to choose the suspect at above chance levels is known as
suspect bias and occurs when the suspect is particularly salient or “sticks out” in some way
(Brigham, Meissner, & Wasserman, 1999). Indeed, there are many ways in which a suspect may
“stick out” from other lineup members (Brigham, Meissner, & Wasserman, 1999). Currently,
suspect bias has not been fully investigated. It may be that certain facial features encourage bias
in choosing the suspect from a lineup and so facilitates misidentification. A better understanding
of what factors encourage biased identification would shed some light on who is at risk for getting misidentified.
1.3

Physiognomy & First Impressions
During the 18th century, Johann Kaspar Lavater, a prominent Swiss writer with an interest

in physiognomy, argued that one’s facial features provide information about one’s character
(Lavater, 1797). For example, he held that the chin was an indicator of willpower and endurance; the forehead an indicator of broadmindedness and intelligence (Lavater, 1797). During the
19th century, Cesare Lombroso attempted to apply physiognomy to the prediction of criminal behavior (Lombroso, 2006; first English translation of the 1876 original). Similarly, Francis Gal-

6
ton sought to identify different “types” of people, including criminals, based on their facial features, using his novel technique of facial composites (Galton, 1892).
Not everyone during this time agreed with the practice and applications of physiognomy,
but it was not until the 20th century that systematic experiments were conducted to test the validity of physiognomy as a science. In one such study (Litterer, 1933), participants viewed pictures
of men and women from magazines and matched each picture with the “correct” social type
(e.g., college president, newspaper editor, politician, university professor, actress). With only
facial features to rely on, participants achieved accuracy rates that were little better than chance,
and so this result failed to support the theory of physiognomy. Interestingly, the author argued
that although participants were not accurate in their judgments, they were highly consistent.
That is, many times participants chose (although incorrectly) the same person for the same role,
which suggests consensus regarding the facial appearances of people in various social roles. Similar findings regarding accuracy emerged in a study that examined how accurately personnel
managers and social workers could judge the intelligence of students from their photographs
(Cook, 1939). Collectively, these studies were assumed to provide evidence that the
physiognomist’s claim that personal character or social role can be inferred from facial features
was inaccurate.
In the 1950s, psychologist Paul Secord changed the focus of face judgment research from
inferred character (i.e., physiognomy) to the perception of character, and so began the study of
first impressions (Todorov, 2017). Across his body of work, Secord found strong consensus
among participants on facial impressions for personality traits such as conscientiousness, friendliness, honesty, and intelligence (Secord, Bevan, & Dukes, 1953). Additionally, he found these
impressions to generalize across cultures (Secord & Bevan, 1956). Importantly, Secord found
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that faces that were rated similarly on personality traits such as trustworthiness, kindness, honesty, and friendliness, tended to have similar facial features (e.g., light eyebrows and complexion),
and that participants had little or no idea regarding what facial features were causing their impressions (Bevan, Secord, & Richards, 1956; Secord, Dukes, & Bevan, 1954). This body of
work suggests that people readily form impressions based on facial appearance, and these impressions are generally agreed upon within and across cultures.
More recent research replicates Secord’s seminal work and also finds that there is strong
agreement on what those possessing traits such as trustworthiness, aggressiveness, and emotional
stability should look like (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Extending
Secord’s work, modern research has found that individuals make character inferences almost instantly and often without conscious awareness (Hassin & Trope, 2000; Willis & Todorov, 2006).
In one such study, participants were shown pictures of females and males with neutral facial expressions for 100 ms, 500 ms, and 1,000 ms and were asked to rate each target face on trustworthiness, attractiveness, aggressiveness, and competence. Results showed that participants made
consistent judgments in 100 ms or less (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Having more viewing time
(500 ms and 1000 ms) did not change participants’ impressions; instead, it served only to increase participants’ confidence in their judgments. Similarly, Bar, Neta, and Linz (2006) found
that individuals need only 39 ms—which is barely enough time to process the face—to form a
first impression. Consistent with previous work, they found that impressions did not change with
a presentation rate of greater than 200 ms. These findings suggest that first impressions based on
facial features are nearly automatic.
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1.4

Stereotypes
Feature-based judgments about character are rooted in stereotypes (Lippman, 1922).

Secord and Backman (1964) define stereotyping as a process involving categorization of individuals or groups according to some set of attributes, consensus as to what those attributes are,
and discrepancies between the supposed and actual traits of the person or group involved. Individuals use these stereotypes in efforts to extract more information about someone when information is limited. Despite a lack of support for the physiognomist’s claims (Cook, 1939; Litterer, 1933), there is ample evidence that people still use these stereotypes today and that they influence decision making (Brandt, 1980; Fiske, 1998). In fact, studies have shown that reliance
on face stereotypes can have serious real-world consequences (see Olivola, Funk, & Todorov,
2014; Todorov et al., 2015 for reviews). For example, studies show that businesses hire CEOs
rated as having a more competent appearance and pay them more than they do less competentlooking applicants (Stoker, Garretsen, & Spreeuwers, 2016). Also, those perceived to have a
highly dominant facial appearance are more likely to get promoted in the military than are those
whose faces are less dominant (Mueller & Mazur, 1996). In an interesting study, Todorov and
colleagues (2005) found that candidates for the U.S. senate whom undergraduate participants
judged as having a more competent facial appearance were more likely to win elections in the
years 2000 and 2002 than were those whose faces were perceived as less competent. This result
has been replicated using participants from different cultures (Poutvaara, Jordahl, & Berggren,
2009; Sussman, Petkova, & Todorov, 2013) and actual voters registered in the United States
(Lawson & Lenz, 2011).
Facial features associated with innocence also appear to influence judgments. In a seminal study, Zebrowitz and McDonald (1991) found that when a defendant in a court case had a
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babyfaced appearance and the case was about intentional harm, the defendant was less likely to
lose the case; however, a babyfaced defendant was more likely to lose when the case was about
accidental harm. In contrast, plaintiffs who were babyfaced were granted more rewards (if they
won), particularly when the defendant had a more mature looking appearance.
Facial features that are linked with trustworthiness also appear to influence decisions. In a
lab-based study, Rezlescu and colleagues (2012) found that undergraduate participants were
more willing to invest money with a trustworthy-looking partner than one who appeared less
trustworthy during an investing game, even when participants were provided with each partner’s
past investment history (Rezlescu et al., 2012). A study conducted using data from the moneylending website, Prosper, replicated these findings. Among potential borrowers who uploaded
pictures of themselves with their applications, those whose pictures looked trustworthy were
more likely to get a loan and to get one with lower interest rates than were those applicants who
looked less trustworthy, even though applicants also provided their credit history, debt, income,
and employment information (Duarte, Siegel, & Young, 2012). Also, Wilson and Rule (2015;
2016) compared trustworthiness ratings for individuals convicted of first degree murder who
were sentenced to life in prison to those for individuals who were convicted of first degree murder and were sentenced to death. Results showed that those convicted of first degree murder and
subsequently sentenced to death were perceived as less trustworthy based on their facial appearance than were those who received life in prison.
The use of stereotypes regarding facial appearance has also been found to affect judgments regarding one’s likelihood to behave violently or aggressively. For example, Afrocentric
facial features (some combination of darker skin, wider nose, and fuller lips) have been linked to
judgments of violence, aggressiveness, or likelihood to engage in criminal behavior (e.g.,
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Eberhardt et al., 2004; Knuycky, Kleider, & Cavrak, 2014). In one lab-based study, for instance,
participants made predictions about the likelihood that different Black men, who varied in the
Afrocentricity of their features would behave aggressively in the future. Participants were also
given information regarding each depicted person’s past aggressive or nonaggressive behavior.
Results revealed that participants predicted that men with Afrocentric facial features would engage in more aggressive behaviors in the future than would men with less Afrocentric features,
regardless of their past histories of aggression (Eberhardt et al., 2004).
In another recent study, participants were tasked with selecting the perpetrator in each of
two mock-crime carjacking scenarios; they were presented with perpetrator-present or perpetrator-absent lineups. Accurate identification rates were high, regardless of the perpetrator face
type [high Afrocentric (87%), low Afrocentric (100%)] in the perpetrator-present lineup. In the
perpetrator-absent lineup, however, innocent foils were frequently identified as the perpetrator of
the crime, with higher misidentification rates for lineup members with high Afrocentric features
(60%) than for those with low Afrocentric features (24%) (Knuycky, Kleider, & Cavrak, 2014).
Applied studies also indicate that Afrocentric facial features influence the way in which
individuals are perceived. For example, research shows that Black defendants with moreAfrocentric facial features receive more convictions and harsher sentences (Blair, Judd, &
Chapleau, 2004) and more death penalty recommendations (Eberhardt et al., 2006) than do defendants with less-Afrocentric facial features. Exonerates from the Innocence Project who were
convicted on the basis of eyewitness misidentification were rated as having a more Afrocentric
face type compared to those who were convicted for other reasons (Kleider-Offut et al., 2017).
Extant research consistently demonstrates that a wide range of facial stereotypes are instantly activated and used to make decisions in a variety of contexts, sometimes with severe con-
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sequences. One face stereotype that is not well understood or studied in the context of lineup
decisions is the criminal face stereotype. Surprisingly, little work has been done in this area despite its relevance to the criminal justice system.
1.5

Criminal face stereotype
Evaluations of “criminality” may be activated by a person’s facial features. Here, the

term criminality refers to the extent to which “a person’s appearance activates stereotypes about
criminals” rather than about any actual criminal behavior (MacLin, Malpass, & Herrera, 2001).
Evidence suggests that there is widespread agreement regarding what constitutes a criminal appearance (Flowe & Humphries, 2011; MacLin & MacLin, 2004). Depending on the study, typical criminals have been described as males (Reed & Reed, 1973) with shaggy long dark hair,
scars, pockmarks, facial hair, tattoos, beady eyes (MacLin & Herrera, 2006), a prominent chin,
lowered eyebrows, and darker pigmentation (Funk, Walker, & Todorov, 2017). In addition, research shows that physically unattractive people are rated as more likely to commit a crime than
attractive people (MacLin & MacLin, 2004).
Funk, Walker, and Todorov (2017) posit that evaluations of criminality are largely driven
by perceived untrustworthiness—an indicator of intent to harm—and dominance—an indicator
of physical ability to act on that intent (see also Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov et al.,
2008). Relationships among criminality, (un)trustworthiness, and dominance have been suggested in the literature. For example, Flowe (2012) presented mugshots from a police database to
participants and had them make various ratings of each person pictured. Results showed that
faces rated high on criminality were also rated as less trustworthy and more dominant. Tendencies to judge a face’s trustworthiness and dominance may have adaptive value in that they can
guide quick decisions regarding whom to approach and whom to avoid (Oosterhof & Todorov,
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2008). However, Todorov (2017) argues that these tendencies can also be problematic, because
people may draw inaccurate conclusions regarding others’ intentions and capabilities, especially
when they have very little other information available to guide their decisions, if those conclusions are based on culturally shared stereotypes, emotional expressions, and their own personal
experience.
Like other facial judgments such as trustworthiness, aggressiveness, competence, and attractiveness, judgments of the criminality of a face occur almost instantly, in 100 ms or less;
longer exposure time only serves to increase confidence in these judgments (Klatt et al., 2016).
Further, research suggests that criminality ratings do not decline over multiple presentations of
the same face (Klatt et al., 2016) and that faces rated high on perceived criminality are more likely to be remembered (MacLin & MacLin, 2004; Yarmey, 1993).
Shoemaker, South, and Lowe (1973) conducted the first lab study to demonstrate the
criminal face stereotype. In this study, undergraduate participants predicted how likely middleaged Caucasian men were to be found guilty of crimes described in contrived scenarios. In a
similar classic study, Goldstein, Chance, and Gilbert (1984) asked participants to select the mass
murderer, armed robber, rapist, medical doctor, clergyman, and engineer from a set of middleaged Caucasian men whose photos had been taken from an acting directory. Participants were
very consistent in whom they chose for each role, suggesting that they shared similar expectations about social roles and facial characteristics. Further, faces selected as criminals were distinct from those selected as professionals. This finding has been replicated many times, in studies that have used pictures of researchers’ friends as stimuli and in samples of both undergraduate participants and police officers (see Dumas & Teste, 2006; Macrae, 1989; Macrae & Shepherd, 1989). Surprisingly, results were highly similar across undergraduate participants and po-
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lice officers (Bull & Greene, 1980). This shows that individuals have an expectation (i.e., stereotype) about criminal appearance and that police may use these face stereotypes as well as ordinary citizens. There may be serious consequences if police officers use these stereotypes while
looking for suspects that meet a witness description as well as during lineup construction.
A few studies have also demonstrated the criminal face stereotype in actual court cases
and lineups. Flowe and Humphries (2011) investigated the relationship between criminality and
mock witness identification and the decision processes underlying those choices. They used six
person photo lineups that had been used in real cases as well as the actual eyewitness descriptions from those cases. Participants either received descriptive information on the perpetrator
(from the eyewitness report) or no description. Participants were to determine for each lineup
which person they thought was the suspect. Results showed that mock witnesses were more likely to report that they had used criminal appearance to make a lineup choice when no description
of the perpetrator was provided. This suggests that witnesses may use criminal appearance as an
alternative decision strategy when they have no information or memory of the perpetrator’s appearance, but are presented with a lineup (study 1). In study 2, authors investigated whether the
faces chosen in study 1 because of criminal appearance were, in fact, more criminal in appearance than other lineup members. Indeed, results showed that faces rated as high in criminality
were chosen more often from lineups when no description was provided. This result suggests
that participants used a criminal face stereotype to infer guilt. Mock witnesses did not appear to
use criminal face bias when they were provided with a suspect description. Authors suggest that
the criminal face stereotype may be most utilized when witness memory is weak or when the
witness is highly suggestible. In that case, witnesses may choose the lineup member who looks
the most criminal compared to other lineup members. Additional analyses showed that these
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lineups were biased in that police had chosen foils that were less criminal in appearance compared to the suspect, making the suspect “pop out” in the lineup, highlighting that suspect bias
with regard to criminal appearance occurs in actual cases.
Additional studies have also demonstrated that criminal appearance can render eyewitness lineups biased (Flowe, Klatt, & Colloff, 2014; McQuiston & Malpass, 2002). Similarly,
using a mock witness paradigm, MacLin and colleagues (2001) created lineups from actual
mugshots. Lineups were created by matching members to a physical suspect description, as is
common police practice. The lineups were shown to participants, who received either crime information, physical appearance information, or both. Results revealed that when participants
were given physical information or a combination of physical and crime information, the lineup
member who best fit the physical description was chosen most often. However, when witnesses
were provided with crime information only, the most criminal looking lineup member was chosen most often. Thus, the use of the criminal stereotype may have guided participants’ decision
process regarding who to pick from the lineup. The results of this study are supported by the
finding that levels of suspect bias, the tendency to choose the suspect at above chance levels, varied depending on whether or not mock witnesses had a description of the culprit (Brigham,
Meissner, & Wasserman, 1999). Further, Flowe and Humphries (2011) found that, on average,
actual witnesses report an average of six features (five physical descriptors and one other type)
when describing a perpetrator.
Given that witnesses often report very few details of the perpetrator, it could be the case
that mock witnesses, as well as actual witnesses, rely on stereotypes to make decisions and identifications when information or memory is lacking. In support of this reasoning, research has
shown that individuals are likely to rely on heuristic processing when information is lacking or
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memory is weak (Kleider et al., 2008). Additionally, studies have demonstrated that individuals
are more likely to fill in informational gaps with schema consistent information, regardless of its
accuracy (Hastie & Park, 1986; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Further, individuals are more likely
to use stereotypes when cognitive resources are limited, (Macrae et al., 2002), such as when doing a difficult task (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987).
It is clear from the literature that perceived criminal appearance can create suspect bias
and that those with a criminal appearance are more likely to be chosen from a lineup given a lack
of actual evidence (Flowe & Humphries, 2011). I examine this in the current study by using a
sample of actual misidentification cases to compare the criminal appearance of those that were
misidentified (exonerates), verified perpetrators, and those outside the criminal justice system.
Given that many actual witnesses are able to provide only minimal physical descriptors of a perpetrator, it is possible that the criminal face stereotype was used when making lineup decisions in
these cases. In misidentification cases, witnesses were presented with at least one identification
procedure (e.g., lineup, showup) that contained the innocent suspect (i.e., exonerate) and the witness should have responded that the perpetrator was not present. However, the innocent suspect
was mistakenly identified as the perpetrator. It is possible that there are systematic errors related
to decision-making strategies that are committed during these misidentifications. One potential
strategy that witnesses may use is the criminal face stereotype, which would systematically influence who gets selected from a lineup. A working hypothesis is that exonerates “looked criminal” and this supported the misidentification of the exonerate. This study aims to replicate previous research on the use of the criminal face stereotype in actual court cases and to extend previous work on face-type bias as a factor in actual trial outcomes by comparing the criminal appearance of exonerates (proven innocent), perpetrators (proven guilty), and fillers (no known connec-
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tion with the criminal justice system). Also, criminal features have not yet been investigated in a
sample of convicted persons.
Additionally, perceptions of criminality may be influenced by characteristics and background of the perceiver. For instance, it may be the case that factors such as one’s own race,
anxiety regarding interracial contact, previous exposure to violent crime, and anxiety about experiencing violent crime in the future may impact one’s perception of criminality.
1.6

Perceiver race, the Cross-race effect, and perception
The Innocence Project reports that of its eyewitness misidentification cases, 42% in-

volved cross-racial identifications (Innocence Project, 2018). This is alarming in light of the
cross-race effect, also called the own-race bias, which is the finding that people more accurately
identify people of one’s own race compared to those of different races (Malpass & Kravitz,
1969). This effect has been replicated across different racial groups (Chiroro et al., 2008), different ages (Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Moore, 2003), and using different memory tests
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Young et al., 2012). In one novel demonstration of the cross-race
effect, researchers utilized unaware store cashiers as participants. Researchers had individuals of
different races go through the cashiers’ lines to make a purchase. Two hours later the cashiers’
memory for customers of different races was tested. Results were in line with the cross-race effect, showing that cashiers had poorer memory for cross-race customers compared to same-race
customers. When researchers removed data from participants who guessed at identification, the
accuracy rate for cross race identification was 34% (Brigham et al., 1982).
The cross-race effect has been shown to affect misidentification rates. In fact, in a metaanalysis, Meissner and Brigham (2001) showed that individuals were 1.4 times more likely to
correctly identify a face if it was of their own race. Conversely, incorrect identifications were
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1.56 times more likely for cross-race compared to same-race faces. Research also shows that, in
general, the greater time between the crime and identification procedure, the less accurate identification becomes (Deffenbacher et al., 2008). However, Marcon and colleagues (2010) found
that the reduction in identification accuracy occurs even more quickly for cross-race compared to
same-race identifications. This is important given that the interval between crime and lineup
procedure can span weeks, months, or even years. Additionally, cross-race differences have
been demonstrated in lineup construction. Brigham and Ready (1985) had Black and White participants create lineups using both Black and White suspects. Results showed that both Black
and White participants were less selective regarding lineup foils when constructing cross-race
lineups rather than same-race lineups. When constructing cross-race lineups, both Black and
White participants chose lineup foils that were easy to reject, thus creating a biased lineup in
which the suspect would have a greater likelihood of being chosen (suspect bias). Lineups tended to be fair when foils were the same race as the participant.
Many theories for the cross-race effect have been proposed, but causes for this effect are
generally broken down into two categories. One set of theories posits that the decreased accuracy in recognizing cross-race faces comes from a lack of expertise with cross-race faces. This
differential experience may have its roots in historical racial segregation laws and in present day
de facto racial segregation (Goldsmith & Blakely, 2010). This segregation causes individuals to
have more contact with people of their own race and so individuals become experts at processing
faces of their own race and are better at recognizing people of their own race. By this theory,
more experience with cross-race faces should yield better recognition accuracy for cross-race
faces. Research has shown mixed support for this theory with some studies failing to find a relationship between experience with cross-race individuals and the cross-race effect (e.g., Malpass
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& Kravitz, 1969). However, other work has demonstrated that practice distinguishing cross-race
faces from one another has worked over a short period of time (Malpass, Lavigueur, & Weldon,
1973). Additionally, other studies have shown longer-term results. For example, Koreans who
had been adopted by White European families showed a reversed cross-race effect as adults.
That is, as adults, the adopted Koreans better recognized White Europeans compared to Koreans
(Sangrigoli et al., 2005). A meta-analysis revealed that experience with cross-race faces only
accounts for approximately 2% of the variance in face recognition (Meissner & Brigham, 2001).
The second set of theories regarding the cross-race effect draws on evidence that individuals tend to think categorically about others (Wilson, Hugenberg, & Bernstein, 2013). This categorization happens automatically and across multiple characteristics such as race, sex, and age
(Ito & Urland, 2003). Sporer’s (2001) account of the cross-race effect posits that the effect occurs due to differential attention allocation based on perceived in-group/out-group differences.
Specifically, same-race faces cause automatic and deep encoding of facial features and attention
is focused on the facial features that enable one to differentiate between same-race faces. However, when viewing other-race faces, automatic categorization occurs and encoding stops at a
superficial level. Detailed facial information is not stored, thus encoding the face into the category “Asian”, for example. That is, categorization makes the commonalities of out-group members
more salient and the group therefore seems more homogeneous, and so individual differences are
lost (Levin, 1996; 2000). Further, individuals are also more likely to judge out-group members
in a negative or harsh way (Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008) as well as judge out-group members as
more guilty and worthy of harsher punishments compared to in-group members (Bodenhausen &
Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, Jr., 1985).
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Research shows that people perceive less variability within categories compared to between categories, such that individuals see large differences between their in-group and their outgroup; however, they see all out-group members as being almost identical (Beale & Keil, 1995).
By processing individuals shallowly as a category, individuating information is missed, which
results in low recognition rates. Support has been found for this theory. For example, the crossrace effect was not demonstrated if participants were informed about the cross-race effect and
asked to pay attention to what differentiates faces rather than what makes them similar
(Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007). Importantly, this so called cross-race effect does not
seem to be race specific, but rather specific to in- and out-groups. For example, Bernstein and
colleagues (2007) found better recognition accuracy for students that went to the same university
as the study participants versus a competing university, regardless of student race.
As it applies to an eyewitness context, if the witness and perpetrator are of different races, then the in-group/out-group model would predict that the face of the perpetrator was shallowly encoded by the witness due to race-based categorization. So, few, if any, individuating features of the face would be committed to memory. When that witness is then presented with a
lineup, and given the fact that their memory is weak, they may rely on stereotypes such as the
criminal face stereotype to aid them in making the identification. Having witnesses and perpetrators who are cross-race may exacerbate any systematic differences that lie between exonerates
and perpetrators. Cross-race identifications may make differences between the in-group and outgroup more salient, with the out-group seeming more homogenous and more likely to be rated in
a negative (criminal) way.
However, previous work has not examined all the ways that the cross-race effect may exert its effects. Historically, the cross-race effect has been examined using various memory tasks
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(e.g., Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Young et al., 2012); however it has not been examined in relation to perceptions of criminality. This study could potentially extend the cross-race effect literature by showing cross-race differences not only as measured directly by memory errors, which
have been demonstrated in the past, but also on facial judgments. The current study examines
whether cross-race judgments have an effect on criminality ratings. The goal is to make preliminary steps towards understanding the decision processes that may contribute to misidentification
rather than the rate of misidentification that has been studied previously. Based on the theories
discussed above, it may be that participants abide by the in- group/out-group model and rate outgroup faces harsher (more criminal) than same-race faces so as to maximize the difference between in-group and out-groups.
Additionally, the majority of past work on the cross-race effect has used White college
students as participants. The current study utilized a sample of self-identified African American
women. Although the study was initially open to college students regardless of gender or race, I
encountered difficulty recruiting participants who identified as male or non-African American.
Consequently, I narrowed recruitment to a demographically circumscribed group that was conveniently accessible. However, there are merits to my focus on African American women in particular, because they constitute an under-studied group who merit representation in this literature.
Accordingly, my study fills a gap in the literature in addition to serving as a potentially informative investigation of the cross-race effect.
Further, expertise models of the cross-race effect posit that the effect may be influenced
by factors such as amount and quality of interracial contact (e.g., Freeman, Pauker, & Sanchez,
2016). The current study thus included measures of these constructs (included as subscales of
the Interracial Anxiety Scale) as predictors of criminality ratings.
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1.7

Perceiver background and perception
In addition to effects of race, research has demonstrated that personal life events such as

trauma may affect the perception of faces. For example, abused children were compared to
non-abused controls (matched for age and IQ) on a task that required them to distinguish between facial expressions of happiness, anger, fear, and sadness. Results showed that abused children judged more faces as angry compared to children with no history of abuse (Cicchetti & Curtis, 2005). Similarly, other studies have found increased attention to threat cues in children with
a history of abuse (Curtis & Cicchetti, 2011, 2013). These results highlight the role of learning
and experience in face perception.
Additionally, research with adult populations shows greater neural activation to threatening versus non-threatening faces (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Calvo & Beltran, 2013). Extending this
work, Chu and colleagues (2016) investigated the impact of childhood interpersonal, childhood
non-interpersonal, and adult trauma in a sample of healthy adults (no anxiety or depression diagnosis) with a history of childhood trauma in response to threatening and non-threatening faces.
Results showed reduced differentiation between threatening faces and non-threatening or even
positive faces for individuals with both adult trauma and interpersonal childhood trauma. Authors find this in keeping with the hyper-aware states of those diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder, responding with a high level of vigilance to both threatening and non-threatening
faces.
Based on these findings that prior trauma alters face perception, the current study hopes
to extend this work by investigating the relation between being the victim of a violent crime and
perceptions of criminality. Consistent with the work reviewed above, it may be the case that if
individuals have previously been the victim of a violent crime, they are more likely to rate faces
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as highly criminal compared to those who have not been a victim of violent crime. Further, it
may be the case that just worrying about becoming a victim of a violent crime in the future is
enough to change face perception such that faces are rated higher in criminality compared to individuals who are less concerned or anxious about future victimization. The current study tests
this.
1.8

Current Study
The current study aims to investigate systematic differences in criminality ratings for re-

al-life exonerates, perpetrators, and fillers. A second aim is to evaluate whether rater characteristics and cross-race judgments, as well as possessing criminal facial features affect those ratings
of criminality. Ultimately, this work may shed light on decision processes underpinning misidentification.
One challenge in this type of research lies in identifying a legal source through which
case information and defendant photographs are publicly available. A second challenge is ensuring that exonerates are factually innocent. One option for addressing these challenges is to use
images of individuals exonerated through DNA. In these cases, convictions based in part on
eyewitness misidentification or other errors (e.g., false confessions, police misconduct) were later overturned based on physical evidence.
The Innocence Project maintains a publicly accessible database of DNA exonerate cases.
This database provides the information needed to conduct an initial test of criminal face type bias
as a factor contributing to misidentifications in real-world criminal cases. Importantly, we are
assured through physical evidence that exonerates in this database are, in fact, innocent. Further,
this same physical evidence that freed exonerates also implicated the true perpetrators in these
cases. That is, for cases where the perpetrator has been found, their guilt has been confirmed by
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DNA evidence. Although it is impossible to control for every variable that may have contributed
to a conviction in a real court case, reliance on the reported case facts taken from court records
provides a reasonable amount of assurance that the data are accurate. Using this database also
provides an established baseline of information that may be subject to replication in other studies.
Based on the literature reviewed above, the current study investigates whether criminality
ratings can be predicted from the number of criminal facial features (e.g., beady eyes (having
small, glittering eyes, especially eyes that seem to gleam with evil, greed, or lust.), long and
shaggy hair, scars, pock marks, etc.), conviction status of the target (exonerate, perpetrator, or
filler), race match between the rater and the target face, and rater background (experience with
violent crime, anxiety about violent crime, and interracial anxiety scale). To investigate, I followed the general procedure of Eberhardt and colleagues (2006), wherein, using archival murder
cases, participants rated pictures of convicted persons based on a number of perceived characteristics.
Hypotheses:
1. Number of criminal features in target faces will correlate positively with criminality
and dominance ratings, but negatively with trustworthiness ratings.
2. Criminality ratings will be predicted by conviction status, with exonerates being rated
significantly more criminal and dominant-looking and less trustworthy than both
perpetrators and fillers.
3. Criminality and dominance ratings will be significantly higher and trustworthiness ratings lower when raters evaluate faces of a different race from their own than when
they evaluate faces of their own race.
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4. Criminality and dominance ratings will be higher and trustworthiness ratings lower
among participants who have experienced violent crime than among those who
have not been the victim of a violent crime.
5. Criminality and dominance ratings will be higher and trustworthiness ratings lower
among participants who are highly anxious about being a victim of violent crime
in the future than among those who are less anxious about becoming a victim of a
violent crime.
6. No specific hypothesis was formed for the relationship between trait ratings (criminality, dominance, trustworthiness) and interracial anxiety. Analyses were exploratory in nature.

2
2.1

EXPERIMENT

Methods

2.1.1 Participants
A power analysis revealed that a total of 200 participants would be needed for the current
study. This estimate was derived from a power curve calculated in the program, Optimal Design.
A power analysis assuming 20 faces per rater, 80% power, alpha = .05, ICC of faces within rater
of .05 to .30, and rater characteristic R2 of zero to .30 suggests that 120 – 200 participants would
be needed to detect an effect size of between .12 and .27. While little is known about the magnitude of relations among these variables and the degree of clustering for raters versus target faces
in a cross-classified model, the suggested sample size is likely to be informative, given general
sample size conventions described in Maas and Hox (2005).
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A total of 307 undergraduate students at Georgia State University participated in this
study in exchange for course credit. Data were cleaned on a case by case basis. Five participants
were excluded for being male. Seventeen participants were excluded for being a race other than
African American. Fourteen participants were excluded from analyses due to completing the
study in less than 20 minutes. As participants had to make 14 ratings for each of 24 faces and
then complete multiple questionnaires, it is unlikely that participants who finished in less than 20
minutes answered questions in a thorough manner. Additionally, 57 participants were excluded
from analyses for providing the same response to all items. Data from the resulting 214 participants were included in the analyses detailed below. All participants identified as African American and female. All participants were 18 years of age or older (range 18 – 60 years, with the majority (84.41%) between the ages of 18 to 21 years.
2.1.2 Design and Analysis
I conducted a cross-classified regression analysis to evaluate how well number of criminal facial features, conviction status (exonerate, perpetrator, or filler), race match between the
rater and the target face, and rater background (experience with violent crime, anxiety about violent crime, and interracial anxiety scale) predict criminality ratings.
I conducted two additional cross-classified regression analyses using dominance and
trustworthiness as outcome variables as each of these constructs have a known relationship with
criminality. The predictor variables in these two analyses were the same as with the criminality
analysis.
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2.1.3 Materials
2.1.3.1 Stimuli
2.1.3.1.1 Innocence Project photographs.
The Innocence Project website contains 356 profiles of individuals exonerated via DNA
evidence, 246 cases of which involved eyewitness identification. Profiles include information
such as cause for incarceration, exonerate and eyewitness race, jurisdiction, and information on
whether the actual perpetrator has been found. A companion site, available with permission
from the Innocence Project, is the Innocence Record. The Innocence Record has much the same
information available as on the Innocence Project site, but for many cases, also contains a wealth
of original case files such as police reports, court transcripts, and news articles associated with
the case. Additionally, the Innocence Record contains, for some cases, the original mugshots of
both exonerates and perpetrators (for cases in which the perpetrator has been found). However,
some of the case files are incomplete, as it is up to the individuals in possession of the original
files to upload them to the Innocence Project/Innocence Record databases.
Out of the 246 eyewitness misidentification cases, a total of 75 mugshots of exonerates
and perpetrators were available at the time of the search. However, 11 of those photos were in
black and white format and so were excluded, leaving a total of 64 color mugshots. All photographs are of Black and White men: 22 Black exonerates, 18 Black perpetrators, 15 White exonerates, and 9 White perpetrators. All photographs are front-facing (i.e., no side views) and were
cropped to include only features above the neck. These photos were cropped close to the chin,
ears, and top of the head so that no clothes (i.e., jumpsuit) were visible and minimal background
showed. Adobe Photoshop was used to resize the images to approximately 3 x 3 inches. Photos
were presented to participants via Qualtrics software.
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2.1.3.1.2 Filler photographs.
As a comparison group and in order to increase the generalizability of the study, filler
faces were presented along with the exonerate and perpetrator photos. These filler faces have no
known connection to the criminal justice system and were taken from an online database. I
chose to use faces from The Chicago Face Database, which was developed at the University of
Chicago and is made freely available for use in scientific research (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink,
2015). It contains high resolution photographs of male and female faces of varying ethnicities
and facial expressions, ranging in age from 17 – 65 years. The database includes information on
each model and includes both physical measures of each face (nose length and width, thickness
of the lips, distance between the eyes) as well as subjective ratings completed by independent
judges (e.g., ratings of masculinity, attractiveness, babyfacedness, happiness). Photos were
standardized, maintaining the same face angle, eye level, and lighting conditions. All models
wore a light gray t-shirt and were photographed against a white background. (For more information on norming data see Ma, Correll, and Wittenbrink, 2015).
All pictures chosen from this database for the current study were Black and White males:
40 White males and 24 Black males. This specific amount was chosen so as to ensure an equal
number of Black and White faces overall (64 White faces and 64 Black faces).
As attractiveness has a known relation to ratings of criminality, pilot ratings were collected regarding the attractiveness of exonerate and perpetrator faces. As in the proposed study,
participants (N = 41) rated the stimuli photos of perpetrators and exonerates on a 1 (not at all attractive) to 7 (very attractive) scale. Results showed an average rating of 2.24. Filler faces were
matched to exonerate and perpetrator’s average attractiveness (M = 2.33).
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Additionally, all selected photos from the Chicago Face Database were front facing with
neutral facial expressions. All photos were presented in color and were resized to approximately
3 x 3 inches so as to match perpetrator and exonerate photos. Like exonerate and perpetrator
photos, filler photos were cropped close to the face, excluding clothing and minimizing background. Photos were presented to participants via Qualtrics software.
2.1.3.2 Measures
2.1.3.2.1 Criminal Facial Feature Inventory.
Previous research shows that individuals have a strong consensus as to what constitutes
the “criminal” look. In order to gain an objective measure of criminal features for each target
face, two independent raters indicated for each target photo (exonerates, perpetrators, and filler
faces), the presence/absence of each feature (e.g., beady eyes, scars, shaggy hair). For each target photo, the number of criminal features rated as present was summed. Possible scores for
each target ranged from 0 (no criminal features present) to 17 (all features present). See appendix for full inventory. Inter-rater reliability was high (Cronbach’s Alpha = .94). Accordingly,
ratings for each face were averaged across the two independent raters.
2.1.3.2.2. Survey of Exposure to Community Violence (SECV).
This measure is a self-report inventory that measures lifetime exposure to a wide variety
of types of community violence, ranging from being chased to being raped and shot. Participants
rate the frequency with which they have experienced each of these events on a 9-point scale (0 =
never; 8 = almost every day). Participants also answer items for each violence type regarding
where the incident took place, if the participant knew the perpetrator, and how long ago each incident occurred. This measure contains over 250 items and can be divided into subscales based
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on victimization and witnessing of given crime events. The length of this scale and many of its
questions (e.g., “Have you only heard about someone being chased. If so, how long ago was the
person chased? Where was the person chased? Who was this person chased by?”) are not wellsuited to the purposes of the current study. As such, I used one of the measure’s subscales called
“all types of violence combined”. This subscale comprises 4 items inquiring about how many
times the participant has been the victim of a violent crime and the timeframe, as well as how
many times the participant has witnessed violent crime and the timeframe (for the current study α
= .67). In addition to using this subscale, I added 4 items inquiring as to whether the gender and
race of the perpetrator were the same as or different from those of the participant. These 4 additional items may be used in the future for another purpose. For the current study, I was particularly interested in how many times each participant has been the victim of a violent crime. I used
this question to determine if each participant has been a victim of violence and coded responses
as yes or no. Victim score was determined by the self-reported frequency of victimization. Participant selection of any occurrence of victimization (one time through almost every day) constitutes victimization. Participant selection of “never” constitutes no victimization. Whether a participant has been victimized in the past was entered into the analysis as a predictor variable. See
appendix for modified subscale.
2.1.3.2.3 Anxiety about Violence Questionnaire (pilot version).
This is a 21 item self-report measure on which participants rate the degree to which they
have a range of safety concerns (for the current study α = .90). Most items are rated on 5-point
semantic differential scales. For the current analysis, I analyzed data from the question, “How
concerned are you that you will be a victim of a violent crime?” This question is rated on a 5-
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point scale (1 = Not at all; 5 = Always). Level of rated concern was entered into the analysis as a
predictor variable. See appendix for full measure.
2.1.3.2.4. Interracial Anxiety Scale.
This 31-item self-report measure assesses interracial anxiety along six dimensions: the
quantity and quality of participants’ previous contact with Black individuals, their outcome expectancies regarding interactions with Black individuals, their anxiety resulting from such interactions, their desire to avoid interactions with Black individuals, and their degree of hostility resulting from interacting with Black individuals (Plant & Devine, 2003). Overall reliability for
this measure as reported by Plant and Devine (2003) is α = .71. In this measure, participants rate
items on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Some items are reversecoded. Per measure instructions, responses were averaged to create an overall interracial anxiety
score, with higher scores indicating more interracial anxiety.
For the current study, I modified the wording of the original scale slightly to reflect
broader interracial anxiety rather than interracial anxiety regarding Black individuals specifically. To accomplish this, I replaced the word “Black” with the phrase “people of a different race
from your own”. See modified scale in appendix. Overall reliability for this modified measure
was α = .78.
2.1.3.2.5 Face Ratings
Participants rated each presented target face on the following properties based on their
perception: trustworthiness, masculinity, babyfacedness, skin tone, aggressiveness, approachability, distinctiveness, Afrocentricity, White stereotypicality, attractiveness, dominance, criminality,
threat, and pleasantness of facial expression. All perceptions were rated on 1 – 7 semantic differential scales where a rating of one indicated an absence of the rated property and seven indi-
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cated extreme presence of the property. For example, with regard to criminality, for each face,
raters made their judgments on a scale where 1 indicated “not at all criminal” and 7 indicated
“extremely criminal.” The exception to this convention was the skin tone scale where 1 indicated light skin tone and 7 indicated dark skin tone.
For the current study, only criminality, trustworthiness, and dominance ratings were analyzed.
2.1.4 Procedure
All instructions and stimuli were presented via computer via Qualtrics software. Participants were told that we were interested in investigating first impressions and assessing how people perceive faces. Further, participants were told:
Your task is to rate a series of faces on different properties. Your ratings should
be based on your own opinions and criteria for each property. There are no right or
wrong answers.
Participants then rated 12 randomly selected White faces and 12 randomly selected Black
faces (total of 24 faces). Order of presentation of White and Black faces were counterbalanced.
Each photograph remained on the screen while the participant answered all questions for that
face before moving on to the next face. Questions for each face were presented in random order.
Participants had unlimited time in which to make their ratings.
Next, participants completed three questionnaires: Survey of Exposure to Community
Violence, Anxiety about Violence Scale, and Interracial Anxiety Scale. The order of questionnaires was randomized for each participant. Lastly, participants provided demographic information, including age, gender, and race.
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3

RESULTS

In person perception, there are two important sources of variability: the target face and
the perceiver (Hehman et al., 2017). In order to test my hypotheses about the relative contribution of each of these sources, I conducted a univariate cross-classified multilevel regression analysis predicting criminality ratings from number of criminal facial features, conviction status of
the target face (exonerate, perpetrator, filler), race match, and rater background (experience with
violent crime, anxiety about violent crime, and interracial anxiety). Criminality ratings were
nested in both rater and target face. The regression was fit in a sequence, adding predictors, in
order to evaluate the stability of estimates (see model descriptions below).
To further evaluate the stability of my results, I conducted two additional univariate
cross-classified multilevel regression analyses, one with trustworthiness as the outcome variable
(same predictors), and the other with dominance as the outcome variable (same predictors). Both
dominance and trustworthiness ratings were nested in both rater and target face. Both trustworthiness and dominance have been well-studied and have a known relationship to criminality,
thus, it is possible to evaluate the models with criminality as the outcome variable relative to the
trustworthiness and dominance models.
The hypothesized models were analyzed using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, &
Bolker, 2012) for R software (R Core Team, 2018). Models were estimated using restricted
maximum likelihood (REML). The two predictor variables anxiety about violent crime and interracial anxiety were grand mean centered. Grand mean centering was not necessary for the
other predictor variables as they were dummy coded and so already had a meaningful zero.
To examine the possibility that there were preexisting differences in the distribution of
criminal facial features across conviction status and target race, I conducted a 2 (target race:

33
black, white) x 3 (conviction status: exonerate, perpetrator, filler) ANOVA. Number of criminal
facial features was the dependent variable.
Results revealed a significant main effect of conviction status on criminal facial features,
F(2, 210) = 37.30, p < .001. A post hoc Bonferroni test revealed that both perpetrators and exonerates had significantly more criminal features than fillers (p < .05).
Results revealed a significant main effect of target race on criminal facial features, F(1,
210) = 13.71, p < .001. A post hoc Bonferroni test revealed that Black targets had significantly
more criminal facial features than White targets (p < .05).
Results revealed a significant interaction between conviction status and target race F(2,
208) = 5.05, p < .01.A series of post hoc Bonferroni tests revealed that White exonerates had
significantly more criminal facial features compared to Black exonerates. Likewise, White perpetrators had significantly more criminal facial features compared to Black perpetrators. However, Black fillers had significantly more criminal facial features than White fillers. All ps < .05.
See limitations and future directions for more discussion on the results of this analysis.
3.1. Criminality Analyses
The mean criminality rating for target faces was 3.65 (SD = 1.90), collapsing across conviction status. Criminality rating had a strong negative correlation with rated trustworthiness (r =
-.46) such that participants that gave a high criminality rating to a face was likely to give a low
trustworthiness rating to that face, and vice versa. Criminality rating also show a moderate positive correlation with rated dominance (r = .29) such that participants that gave a high criminality
rating to a face were likely to give a high dominance rating to that same face. Criminality rating
also had a small positive correlation with number of criminal facial features (r = .16) meaning
that as the number of criminal facial features a target face possessed increased, the higher the
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criminality rating. Criminality rating also had a small negative correlation (r = -.16) with race
match between the participant and target face such that when participant and target race matched,
rated criminality tended to be lower than when there was a race mismatch. Also, there was a
small positive correlation between criminality ratings and whether the target face was a perpetrator (r = .14) such that if the target face was a perpetrator, the criminality rating tended to be higher than if the target face was not a perpetrator. Lastly, there was a small positive correlation between criminality ratings and whether the target face was an exonerate (r = .15) such that if the
target face was an exonerate, the criminality rating tended to be higher than if the target face was
not an exonerate.
Models were fit in three stages. First, an intercept only model (baseline model), then a
model containing only the face variables (perpetrator, exonerate, race match, and feature) (basic
model), and, lastly, the full model containing all predictor variables (both face and rater variables). Each multilevel model can be represented with an equation. See Table 1 for an explanation of variable abbreviations.
Baseline:Ytrait = If + Ir + e
Basic:Ytrait = B0 + B1Perp + B2Exon + B3Feat + B4Match + Ir + e
Full:Ytrait = B0 + B1Perp + B2Exon + B3Feat + B4Match + B5Victim + B6AnxVic + B7AnxInt + e
Number of criminal facial features was a significant predictor of criminality. The effect
was similar in magnitude across the basic and full models (B = .10 and .11, respectively). See
figures 1, 2, and 3 for the baseline, basic, and full models of criminality, respectively.
Conviction status was a significant predictor of criminality with both perpetrators and exonerates being rated as significantly more criminal-looking compared to filler faces. However,
the results of a Wald test show no significant difference between rated criminality of perpetrators
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and exonerates. The Wald statistic was calculated for both the basic and full models. Waldbasic =
1.01 [95% CI = .68, 1.38]. Waldfull = .90 [95% CI = .66, 1.38].
In the basic model, the average criminality rating (intercept) for a filler face was 3.02. If
the face was of a perpetrator, the criminality rating increased by 1.03. If the race was of an exonerate, the criminality rating increased by .86. In the full model, the average criminality rating
(intercept) for a filler face was 2.83. If the face was of a perpetrator, the criminality rating increased by 1.02. If the face was of an exonerate, the criminality rating increased by .85.
Race match was a significant predictor of criminality. Specifically, when there was a
race match between rater and the face pictured, the criminality rating tended to be lower than
when the rater was evaluating a face different from their race. See Table 5.
Past victimization was not a reliable predictor of rated criminality. Likewise, neither
anxiety about future victimization nor interracial anxiety was found to be predictors of rated
criminality.
One way to determine the separate contributions of faces and raters to the outcome variable, in this case, criminality, is to compute the intra-class correlation (ICC). This method parses
out the variance in the outcome (criminality) that is due to the target face and the variance that is
due to rater characteristics. By computing an ICC for each outcome, I will investigate whether
the variance in faces and raters are the same across criminality, dominance, and trustworthiness.
Variance estimates from the full criminality model were used to compute the intra-class correlation for both face and rater: face ICC = .22, rater ICC = .27.
3.2 Dominance Analyses
The mean dominance rating for target faces was 3.62 (SD = 1.76), collapsing across conviction status. Dominance rating also show a moderate positive correlation with rated criminali-
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ty (r = .29) such that participants that gave a high dominance rating to a face were likely to give a
high criminality rating to that same face. Dominance rating also had a small positive correlation
with number of criminal facial features (r = .15) meaning that as the number of criminal facial
features a target face possessed increased, the higher the dominance rating. Dominance rating
also had a small positive correlation (r = .12) with race match between the participant and target
face such that when participant and target race matched, rated dominance tended to be higher
than when there was a race mismatch. Also, there was a small positive correlation between dominance ratings and whether the target face was a perpetrator (r = .13) such that if the target face
was a perpetrator, the dominance rating tended to be higher than if the target face was not a perpetrator. Lastly, there was a small positive correlation between dominance ratings and whether
the target face was an exonerate (r = .11) such that if the target face was an exonerate, the dominance rating tended to be higher than if the target face was not an exonerate. See Tables 2, 3,
and 4 for descriptive statistics.
Like the criminality models, dominance models were also fit in 3 stages (baseline, basic,
and full). The only difference between dominance and criminality models were the outcome variable. All predictor variables were the same.
Number of criminal facial features was a significant predictor of dominance and was similar in magnitude across the basic and full models (B = .07 and .08, respectively).
Conviction status was a significant predictor of dominance with both perpetrators and exonerates being rated as significantly more dominant-looking compared to filler faces. The results
of a Wald test show no significant difference between rated dominance of perpetrators and exonerates. The Wald statistic was calculated for both the basic and full models. Waldbasic = 1.58
[95% CI = .43, .97]. Waldfull = 1.27 [95% CI = .39, .93].
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In the basic model, the average dominance rating (intercept) for a filler face was 2.86. If
the face was of a perpetrator, the dominance rating increased by .70. If the face was of an exonerate, the dominance rating increased by .49. In the full model, the average criminality rating
(intercept) for a filler face was 2.82. If the face was of a perpetrator, the dominance rating increased by .66. If the face was of an exonerate, the dominance rating increased by .49. See Table
6.
Race match was a significant predictor of dominance. Specifically, when there was a
race match between rater and the face pictured, the dominance rating tended to be higher than
when the rater was evaluating a face different from their race.
Past victimization was not a reliable predictor of rated dominance. Likewise, neither
anxiety about future victimization nor interracial anxiety was found to be predictors of rated
dominance.
Additionally, variance estimates from the full dominance model were used to compute
the ICC for both face and rater: face ICC = .12, rater ICC = .46.
3.3 Trustworthiness Analyses
The mean trustworthiness rating for target faces was 2.62 (SD = 1.53), collapsing across
conviction status. Trustworthiness rating had a strong negative correlation with rated criminality
(r = -.46) such that participants that gave a high trustworthiness rating to a face was likely to give
a low criminality rating to that face, and vice versa. Trustworthiness rating also had a small
positive correlation (r = .19) with race match between the participant and target face such that
when participant and target race matched, rated trustworthiness tended to be higher than when
there was a race mismatch. Trustworthiness rating also had a small negative correlation with
number of criminal facial features (r = -.09) meaning that as the number of criminal facial fea-
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tures a target face possessed increased, the lower the trustworthiness rating. Also, there was a
small negative correlation between trustworthiness ratings and whether the target face was a perpetrator (r = -.11) such that if the target face was a perpetrator, the trustworthiness rating tended
to be lower than if the target face was not a perpetrator. Lastly, there was a small negative correlation between trustworthiness ratings and whether the target face was an exonerate (r = -.05)
such that if the target face was an exonerate, the trustworthiness rating tended to be lower than if
the target face was not an exonerate.
Like the criminality and dominance models, trustworthiness models were also fit in 3
stages (baseline, basic, and full). The only difference between trustworthiness, criminality, and
dominance models was the outcome variable. All predictor variables were the same.
Number of criminal facial features was a significant predictor of trustworthiness. The effect was similar in magnitude across the basic and full models (B = -.06 and -.06, respectively).
See Table 7.
Conviction status was a significant predictor of trustworthiness. Specifically, both perpetrators and exonerates were rated as significantly less trustworthy compared to filler faces. Perpetrator faces were rated as significantly less trustworthy compared to exonerates. The results of
a Wald test confirmed the difference between rated trustworthiness of perpetrators and exonerates. The Wald statistic was calculated for both the basic and full models. Waldbasic = 2.26 [95%
CI = -.82, -.40]. Waldfull = 2.21 [95% CI = -.81, -.38].
In the basic model, the average trustworthiness rating (intercept) for a filler face was
2.85. If the face was of a perpetrator, the trustworthiness rating decreased by .61. If the face was
of an exonerate, the trustworthiness rating decreased by .37. In the full model, the average
trustworthiness rating (intercept) for a filler face was 2.98. If the face was of a perpetrator, the
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trustworthiness rating decreased by .60. If the face was of an exonerate, the trustworthiness rating decreased by .36.
Race match was a significant predictor of trustworthiness. Specifically, when there was a
race match between rater and the face pictured, the trustworthiness rating tended to be higher
than when the rater was evaluating a face different from their race.
Neither past victimization nor interracial anxiety was found to be reliable predictors of
rated trustworthiness. Anxiety about becoming a victim of violent crime was found to be a significant predictor of trustworthiness. Specifically, individuals who reported greater anxiety
about future victimization tended to rate target faces as more trustworthy.
Additionally, variance estimates from the full trustworthiness model were used to compute the ICC for both face and rater: face ICC = .10, rater ICC = .55.
4

DISCUSSION

The goal of the current study was to make preliminary steps towards understanding the
decision processes that may contribute to eyewitness misidentification. Of particular interest
was the use of the criminal face stereotype and the factors that may promote its use. I examined
this in the current study by using a sample of actual misidentification cases to compare the criminal appearance of those that were misidentified (exonerates), verified perpetrators, and those
outside the criminal justice system. Given the relationship of perceived criminality to that of
perceived dominance and trustworthiness noted in the literature (Funk, Walker, and Todorov,
2017; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov et al., 2008), those trait impressions were also explored here.
4.1 Criminality
4.1.1Face Variables
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All four face variables were found to be significant predictors of criminality. Results of
the current study show that number of criminal facial features reliably predicts ratings of criminality. Specifically, those targets that were rated as having more criminal facial features were
rated as higher in criminality, which supported my hypothesis.
As predicted, results also revealed that conviction status reliably predicted rated criminality. Specifically, both perpetrators and exonerates were rated as significantly more criminal
compared to filler faces. However, perpetrator faces were not significantly different compared to
exonerates, which was counter to my hypothesis that exonerates would be rated a significantly
more criminal than perpetrators.
The current study examined whether cross-race judgments have an effect on criminality
ratings. Results showed that when there was a race match between rater and the face pictured,
the criminality rating tended to be lower than when the rater was evaluating a face different from
their race. That is, African American females rated Black men lower in criminality compared to
white men. This finding is in line with my hypothesis.
4.1.2 Rater Variables
None of the rater variables including experience with violent crime, anxiety about future
victimization, and interracial anxiety were found to be significant predictors of criminality.
4.1.3 ICC
In person perception, there are two important sources of variability: the target face and
the perceiver (Hehman et al., 2017). The ICC analyses inform about the relative contribution of
each of these sources of variability for impressions of criminality. The variance explained in
criminality models were fairly evenly split between rater and face.
4.2 Dominance
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4.2.1 Face Variables
As with criminality, all face variables were found to be significant predictors of dominance. Results of the current study show that number of criminal facial features reliably predicted ratings of dominance. Specifically, those targets that were rated as having more criminal facial features were rated as higher in dominance. This finding supports my hypothesis.
Also, results revealed that conviction status reliably predicted rated dominance ratings.
Specifically, both perpetrators and exonerates were rated as significantly more dominant compared to filler faces. However, perpetrator faces were not significantly different compared to exonerates, which was counter to my hypothesis that exonerates would be rated as significantly
more dominant than perpetrators.
The current study also examined whether cross-race judgments have an effect on dominance ratings. Results revealed that when there was a race match between rater and the target, the
dominance rating tended to be higher than when the rater was evaluating a face different from
their race. That is, African American females tended to rate Black men higher in dominance
compared to white men, which was counter to my hypothesis that white men would be rated as
higher in dominance than Black men.
4.2.2 Rater Variables
None of the rater variables including experience with violent crime, anxiety about future
victimization, and interracial anxiety were found to be significant predictors of dominance.
4.2.3 ICC
Approximately half (46%) of variance in dominance models was explained by who the
rater was. However, only 12% of variance in the dominance models was explained by characteristics of the face being rated.

42

4.3 Trustworthiness
4.3.1 Face Variables
As with both criminality and dominance, all four face variables were found to be significant predictors of trustworthiness. Results of the current study show that number of criminal facial features reliably predicts ratings of trustworthiness. Specifically, those targets that were rated as having more criminal facial features were rated as low on trustworthiness, which supports
my hypothesis.
Also, results revealed that conviction status reliably predicted rated trustworthiness.
Specifically, both perpetrators and exonerates were rated as significantly less trustworthy compared to filler faces. Further, perpetrators were rated significantly less trustworthy than exonerates, which was opposite of my prediction.
Lastly, the current study also examined whether cross-race judgments have an effect on
trustworthiness ratings. Results showed that when there was a race match between rater and the
face pictured, the trustworthiness rating tended to be higher than when the rater was evaluating a
face different from their race. That is, African American females rated Black males as more
trustworthy compared to white males, which was in line with my hypothesis.
4.3.2 Rater Variables
Neither past victimization nor interracial anxiety were significant predictors of trustworthiness ratings. However, anxiety about future victimization was found to be a significant predictor. Specifically, individuals who reported greater anxiety about future victimization tended
to rate faces as more trustworthy. This result was unexpected, in that no other rater variables
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were significant predictors in any of the other models. Additionally, this specific result was only
marginally significant. This result should be further examined through replication.
4.3.3 ICC
Approximately half (55%) of variance in trustworthiness models can be explained by
who the rater is. However, only 10% of variance in the trustworthiness models can be explained
by characteristics of the face being rated.
4.4 General
Several face and rater variables were explored here in trying to predict trait impressions
of criminality, dominance, and trustworthiness. Largely, it was only the face variables that had
predictive power. Below I discuss the contributions of individual predictors and their relation to
existing literature.
4.4.1 Features
Number of criminal features was predictive of all three outcomes. The result that number
of criminal facial features predicts trait judgments supports previous studies finding that individuals make feature-based judgments (stereotypes) to create expectations about what certain traits
should look like and that the use of these facial stereotypes influence decision making (e.g.,
Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Brandt, 1980; Eberhardt et al., 2006; Fiske, 1998; Zebrowitz &
McDonald, 1991). In particular, this finding supports previous research finding that there is
strong agreement on what those possessing traits such as trustworthiness and dominance should
look like (e.g., Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Willis & Todorov, 2006). The current study also
adds to the accumulating evidence that suggests that there is widespread agreement regarding
what constitutes a criminal appearance (criminal stereotype) (Flowe & Humphries, 2011;
MacLin & MacLin, 2004). In previous studies, typical criminals have been described as males
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(Reed & Reed, 1973) with shaggy long dark hair, scars, pockmarks, facial hair, tattoos, beady
eyes (MacLin & Herrera, 2006), a prominent chin, lowered eyebrows, and/or darker pigmentation (Funk, Walker, & Todorov, 2017). This was the first study known to the author to investigate so-called criminal features in a sample of actual convicted persons. All of these facial features were examined in the current study and found to be related to criminal appearance, with
more criminal facial features constituting a more criminal appearance. Lastly, this result supports previous work suggesting a reliable relationship between criminality, dominance, and
trustworthiness, specifically, that target faces that are rated as high in criminality are also rated
high in dominance, but low on trustworthiness (Flowe, 2012; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008;
Todorov, Said, Engell, Oosterhof, 2008).
4.4.2 Conviction Status
Likewise, conviction status was also predictive of all three outcomes. As discussed
above, these findings are in accordance with the literature in that criminality and dominance ratings have an inverse relationship with trustworthiness (Flowe, 2012; Oosterhof & Todorov,
2008; Todorov, Said, Engell, Oosterhof, 2008).
In considering the result that perpetrators and exonerates were found to be more criminal
and dominant-looking and less trustworthy compared to filler faces, there are many possible explanations. One reason lies in the conditions under which photos were taken. Todorov and Porter (2014) point out that the face is rarely stationary, but continually changes to express different
emotions, some subtle and others quite obvious. A microexpression is a brief, involuntary facial
expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Research shows that microexpressions occur as quickly as
.4 to .5 seconds (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2018) and may be signs of concealed emotions or intentions (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Previous research has shown that even faces perceived as neu-
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tral at a macro level show emotion through microexpressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Said,
Haxby, & Todorov, 2011) and these emotions may be interpreted as traits (e.g., trustworthiness)
(Knutson, 1996; Malatesta, Fiore, & Messina, 1987; Montepare & Dobish, 2003). It follows that
photos may capture microexpressions and thus influence character judgment. That is, character
judgment may then, be highly dependent upon the exact moment the picture is taken.
The microexpression literature may be especially relevant here because of the specific
conditions under which pictures of the targets were taken. Individuals who posed for the filler
photos did so voluntarily; those who provided mugshots presumably did so involuntarily. It
seems plausible that individuals being placed under arrest would have been under stress at the
time of being photographed. So, even though all stimulus pictures were taken in a similar manner – front facing, neutral expressions, background minimized, there could be subtle differences
(microexpressions) that reflect the stress perpetrators and exonerates were under when their pictures were taken. So, it is possible that photos taken during the process of an arrest may differ in
some fundamental ways from photos taken in a lab setting and that picture selection here may
have contributed to the result that perpetrators and exonerates had higher criminality ratings
compared to filler faces.
Todorov and Porter (2014) found that random variations in pictures of the same individual resulted in different trait impressions. In fact, they found that there was just as much variation
in impressions of the same person across different pictures as compared to variation of different
individuals. They argue that trait impressions are highly dependent on which picture is chosen.
Further, Todorov and Porter (2014) challenge findings from Valla and colleagues (2011) and
Porter and colleagues (2008) for their choice of control images. Valla and colleagues (2011)
compared mugshots to photos of students in terms of criminality. Results showed that mugshots
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were rated as more criminal than students. Similarly, Porter and colleagues (2008) compared
photos of criminals featured on America’s Most Wanted with photos of recipients of the Nobel
Peace Prize. Results showed that photos chosen from America’s Most Wanted were rated as
significantly more criminal than Nobel Peace Prize winners. Todorov and Porter (2014) argue
that it may be the difference in context under which these photos were taken that may be responsible for results and not actual differences in criminality or appearance.
In support of Todorov and Porter’s arguments, Rule and colleagues (2013) conducted a
study in which they compared criminals and non-criminals within the same context. In a multipart study, Rule and colleagues (2013) compared criminals and non-criminals within the business world and found that these two groups were indistinguishable in terms of perceptions of
trustworthiness (Study 2). Again, comparing photos within the same domain, authors found no
perceived differences in trustworthiness for military criminals and military heroes (Study 3). Finally, authors compared students who cheated on a test in the lab versus students who did not.
Again, their faces were indistinguishable in terms of a trustworthy appearance. Considering this
series of studies in combination with Todorov and Porter’s (2014) work and the current study
may suggest that significant differences in trait appearances may be highly dependent upon photo selection and the conditions those photos were taken under.
Another possible explanation for these results may come from the difference in photos.
The lab photos from the Chicago Face Database were all quite uniform in posing. However, although mugshots taken from the Innocence Project were all front facing, not every aspect of the
posing was as controlled as in the database photos. For example, research shows that head tilt
has the result of influencing trait perceptions such that a downward head tilt increases perceptions of facial femininity (Burke & Sulikowski, 2010) and an upward tilt increases perceptions of
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facial masculinity (Burke & Sulikowski, 2010). Faces with an upward tilt have also been perceived to have a heavier weight, which relates to increased perception of intimidation and dominance (Schneider, Hecht, & Carbon, 2012). Further, research shows that manipulating the facial
width-to-height ratio (fWHR) can influence perceptions of dominance and increase perceptions
of intimidation. Facial WHR relies on an individual’s bone structure and is measured as the distance between the cheekbones divided by the distance between the upper lip and mid-brow
(Carre, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009). Research shows that greater fWHR is related to perceptions of aggressiveness (Carre, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Geniole et al., 2012) and
untrustworthiness (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010) compared to those with smaller fWHR. The fWHR is
generally thought to be an unchangeable feature of the face; however, Hehman and colleagues
(2013) investigated the possibility that fWHR could be manipulated to appear to be increased by
tilting the head upwards or downwards. They found that both male and female targets were perceived to be more intimidating when tilting the head upwards or downwards compared to no
head tilt. Authors attribute this perceived intimidation to be due to the appearance of an increased fWHR. In the current study, it could be the case that at the time mugshot photos were
taken, heads were tilted in an upwards or downwards tilt as an expression of dominance or intimidation out of anger at the arresting officer, thus making mugshot photos of perpetrators and exonerates appear more dominant and criminal and less trustworthy.
Furthermore, the fWHR may be a potential explanation for the finding that perpetrators
were rated as less trustworthy compared to exonerates. Not only is a greater fWHR related to
perceptions of aggression and untrustworthiness, studies have also shown that greater fWHR is
positively correlated with greater physical aggression (Carre & McCormick, 2008; Geniole et al.,
2014, Goetz et al., 2013; Haselhuhn, Ormiston, & Wong, 2015; but see Deaner et al., 2012 and
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Gomez-Valdes et al., 2012 for another view), physical strength (Hehman, Flake, & Freeman,
2015), and untrustworthy behavior (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; but see Rule et al., 2013 for another
view). So, the true perpetrators of the crimes in the Innocence Project database were factually
guilty of an untrustworthy behavior (a heinous crime) and physically and mentally able to carry
out these ill intentions. The criminal history of exonerates was not explored in this study. We
know that exonerates were innocent of the crime they were incarcerated for, but we do not know
of previous arrest records for crimes they may have committed before or after that time. Presumably the filler faces had no known connection to the criminal justice system and likely varied
in their intentions and ability to carry those intentions out.
4.4.3 Race Match
Further, race match was also predictive of all three outcomes. The current results support
previous work finding that individuals are more likely to judge out-group members in a negative
or harsh way (Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008) as well as judge out-group members as more guilty
compared to in-group members (Bodenhausen & Wyer, Jr., 1985). Here, African American
women rated out-group, White men, as more criminal than Black men. The finding that participants rated their out-group as more negative is consistent with the theory of the cross-race effect
that posits that individuals tend to think categorically about others (Wilson, Hugenberg, & Bernstein, 2013).
In the current study, African American women rated Black men as less criminal, but
more dominant. This is an interesting finding in light of the literature. Previous studies have
shown that faces rated high on criminality also tend to be rated as more dominant (Flowe, 2012;
Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov et al., 2008). Dominance is typically associated with
physical ability and potentially even aggression (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Framed in this
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way, this finding may then support the idea that individuals see their own in-group as more positive (physically capable) and their out-group as possessing more negative traits (less physically
capable). Indeed, research shows that how one views dominance may largely depend on context
(Hehman et al., 2015). For example, being dominant may be viewed as a positive trait in certain
kinds of competitions (e.g., sports).
4.4.4. Rater Variables
There are many possible reasons why rater variables were not significant predictors of
trait impressions here. For the anxiety about becoming a victim of a crime in the future variable,
perhaps it is the case that participants have become desensitized to crime and victimization due
to living in a major city and hearing about the widespread stories about different crimes. Furthermore, being anxious about becoming a victim may depend of context. Participants may not
be an accurate judge when making ratings from home, which is likely a safe and comfortable environment. So, making ratings about concerns over future crime in a safe context may not make
for accurate ratings. Of course, it could be the case that simply worrying over future victimization is not enough to alter face perception.
Past victimization was not found to be a significant predictor of trait impressions in the
current study. Previous work (Chu et al., 2016; Cicchetti & Curtis, 2005; Curtis & Cicchetti,
2011, 2013) has demonstrated that past experience, including trauma and abuse, has the ability to
influence face perception. That finding was not replicated here. One thing to consider in light of
the current findings is that we do not know the nature of participants’ past victimization. It could
be that changes in face perception occur only after trauma or abuse of a certain severity or that
happens repeatedly over time.
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It could be the case that interracial anxiety was not a significant predictor of trait impressions when considering that participants were all African American females and that the stimulus
photos were of both Black and white men. In this case, it is possible that interracial anxiety only
has an effect on trait impressions when viewing white faces. That is, it may be the case that racial match interacts with interracial anxiety to influence ratings of trait impressions. Future research should explore this possibility.
4.4.5 ICC
The variance explained in criminality models were fairly evenly split between characteristics of the rater and characteristics of the face being rated. However, dominance and trustworthiness showed a different pattern of clustering, with rater variables accounting for the bulk of
the variance in the model. In examining these values, it is apparent that rater characteristics play
an important role in trait impressions, especially for dominance and trustworthiness. However,
none of the rater variables in the current study were found to be significant. Future work should
either refine the measures used for rater variables in the current study or seek new variables that
might impact trait impressions. Given the amount of variance explained for rater characteristics,
this seems like a worth-while avenue for future research.
This different pattern of face and rater variance across trait impressions has been previously studied. Hehman and colleagues (2017) suggest that some impressions are driven largely
by the characteristics of the perceiver while other impressions are largely driven by the target.
Indeed, the current pattern of results across the three models supports this idea in that the rater
and face variance was different for criminality compared to trustworthiness and dominance.
Hehman and colleagues (2017) further explain that impressions of trustworthiness and dominance may vary greatly across perceivers because each perceiver may have a different idea of
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what constitutes a specific trait. Authors give the example that one perceiver may think that a
target with a strong build is dominant; however, another perceiver may think that a target with a
confident smile is dominant. As such, it is likely that perceivers focus on different facial features
in which to make their trait judgments. This is in agreement with the current study as variability
due to rater was much larger for the trait impressions of dominance and trustworthiness.
4.5 Implications
Factors influencing eyewitness misidentification merit investigation as the consequences
of being misperceived as criminal may be severe. Moreover, lives are potentially put in danger if
the true perpetrator in an eyewitness misidentification case remains free.
The current study was the first known to directly compare ratings of the appearance of
perpetrators and exonerates. The results showed that exonerates and perpetrators were perceived
as more criminal and dominant, while being less trustworthy than fillers with no known connection to the criminal justice system. Even though my hypotheses regarding exonerates possibly
having a more criminal look than perpetrators was not supported, it is still worthwhile to examine the result that for criminality and dominance, perpetrators and exonerates were indistinguishable. If perpetrators and exonerates are equally criminal and dominant-looking and it is the innocent suspect (future exonerate) in the lineup who looks criminal amongst other lineup members who do not look criminal or look less criminal, that may cause suspect bias and may facilitate misidentification. This possibility is potentially increased given that the fillers in lineups are
often off duty police officers, interns, or taken from old drivers license photos (i.e., individuals
with no known connection to the criminal justice system) (Wells & Olson, 2003). Furthermore,
faces rated high on perceived criminality (e.g., exonerates) are more likely to be remembered
(MacLin & MacLin, 2004; Yarmey, 1993), which is a concern given that many criminal investi-
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gations conduct multiple lineups and showups in a case, which promotes an innocent suspect being misidentified as the perpetrator because they are familiar (because they have been viewed
many times) rather than because they were the actual perpetrator of the crime.
The current findings on differences in criminal appearance together with past research
call for criminal appearance to be taken into account, along with physical appearance, when constructing lineups. Flowe and Humphries (2011), who analyzed real police lineups, found that in
over half of the lineups used, the suspect was rated as the most or second most criminal-looking
member. Measures of lineup fairness should include both measures of physical similarity of
lineup members and measures of criminal appearance similarity. This ensures a fair lineup in
which all members have an equal chance of being selected. In creating a fair lineup, criminality
could be held constant across lineup members so as to reduce the impact of criminal face bias
and thus reduce the likelihood of misidentifications.
However, more research is needed before firm conclusions can be made. In order to
make the conclusion about exonerates from the Innocence Project being victims of suspect bias,
the original lineups and lineup members from these cases would need to be studied. However, a
thorough search of the Innocence Project and the Innocence Record reveal that these photo
lineups are rare to find.
Race match was found to significantly affect trait ratings of criminality, dominance, and
trustworthiness in the current study. Accordingly, cross-race effects may have an effect on trait
inferences at different stages in a case. Cross-race effects may occur when a witness sees a
cross-race perpetrator commit a crime, cross-race effects may occur again if a police officer is
creating a lineup of people that are of a different race than they are, and finally again, when the
witness attempts a cross-race identification from the lineup. Police should be trained on cross-
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race effects and other biases that might affect lineup creation. When possible, police officers
should construct only same-race lineups to avoid inserting bias into the lineup.
Yet another application for this work may be the implementation of police training in the
use of stereotypes. Research has shown that police officers are just as likely as ordinary citizens
to use stereotypes (Dumas & Teste, 2006; Macrae, 1989; Macrae & Shepherd, 1989), so training
them to avoid creating biased lineups may help reduce the problem as witnesses will actually
have to discriminate the lineup members rather than just defaulting to the most criminal-looking
member.
Another avenue for improvement may be jury instructions. Currently, at the end of a trial, many courts give jury instructions containing information about the unreliable nature of eyewitness memory (National Academy of Science, 2014). It may be possible to include additional
information about face biases and cross-race effects in jury instructions. However, the utility of
jury instructions on eyewitness identification is debated, with some studies finding that such instructions only serve to make jurors more suspicious of all eyewitness information (Martire &
Kemp, 2009).
4.6 Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of the current study was that pictures taken from the Innocence Project
and Innocence Record vary in quality (e.g., photos taken with different cameras, different lighting, etc.), which is a drawback in using real case information. This may have been problematic,
as filler photos from the Chicago Face Database were all high-quality digital images taken under
standardized conditions in which models were instructed to pose with neutral facial expressions.
If perpetrator and exonerate photos contained even subtle emotional expressions, this could have
influenced results. Further, there was an uneven distribution of facial features categorized as
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“criminal” across target race, which may have affected results. Specifically, it could be the case
that White faces were rated as more criminal and less trustworthy solely because they possessed
a higher number of criminal facial features and may have nothing to do with cross-race judgment. If future studies could keep constant the number of criminal facial features across race,
that would allow a clearer picture to emerge regarding the contribution of race versus criminal
facial features. Lastly, there were only quality photos available for 37 exonerates and 27 perpetrators. As a result, caution should be exercised in drawing strong conclusions from this study
until findings can be replicated.
Another limitation pertains to the analyses. Outcomes were on a 7-point ordinal scale,
but for the purposes of the current project, were treated as intervally scaled. A multilevel model
for categorical outcomes (e.g., logistic) could provide validation of the current results. Also, additional analyses are needed in order to determine any possible moderating effect of racial mismatch and interracial anxiety.
Additionally, the three outcomes were fit separately. While this approach allows us to
evaluate predictors’ effects multiple times, it may invite Type-I error. Further, the separate analyses neglect relations across face ratings. A three-outcome multilevel SEM could provide more
complete information about the joint relations across these three outcomes.
As this was a preliminary investigation, replication is needed in order to strength findings. Future studies should utilize different photo stimuli sets from other databases. Given the
possible limitations of using highly standardized photos as a control set for mugshots discussed
above, it will be important for future studies to either take extra steps to control for additional
aspects of differences in photos or find a different control group that is more comparable to
mugshots. Additionally, given the nature of proposed criminal facial features noted in the litera-

55
ture, future work may investigate the possibility that criminal features are confounded with socioeconomic status. Future studies may utilize different measures of rater characteristics or investigate additional rater characteristics than the ones examined in the current study. Lastly, other
facial features could be coded and modeled in order to account for factors such as stress, duress,
or emotional content.
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Table 1
Abbreviation Key and Summary of Variables

Face Variables
Match

Feature

Perp

Exon

Rater Variables
Victim

AnxVic

AnxInt

Outcome Variables
Crim
Dom
Trust
Other
FaceID
RaterID

Description
Whether the race of participant (ALL African American participants) matched
the race of each picture
they rated (AA or not)
Number of “criminal” facial
features each face has as
rated by 2 independent
raters. Ratings were highly
correlated, so they were averaged.
Refers to the status of each
rated face. Specifically
whether or not the rated
face was that of an actual
perpetrator
Refers to the status of each
rated face. Specifically
whether or not the rated
face was that of an exonerate

Scale used
0 = no match
1 = match

Refers to whether or not the
subject has been a victim of
a crime before
Refers to how anxious the
subject is about becoming a
victim of a violent crime in
the future
Refers to the subject's level
of anxiety about interracial
contact

0 = no
1 = yes

Perceived criminality of
each rated face
Perceived dominance of
each rated face
Perceived trustworthiness of
each rated face

1 – 7 scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very
much so)
1 – 7 scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very
much so)
1 – 7 scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very
much so)

Refers to the specific face
rated
Subject number

String variable

1 – 17

0 = not a perpetrator
1 = a perpetrator

0 = not an exonerate
1 = an exonerate

5 point scale (1 = never; 5 = always)

Responses to 31 items were averaged
to create an overall interracial anxiety
score, with higher scores indicating
more interracial anxiety.
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Table 2
Correlation of Outcome and Predictor Variables

1
1Crim

2

3

4

6

7

8

--

9

--

1Trust -.46***

--

3Dom

.29***

4Perp

.14*** -.11*** .13***

5Exon

.15*** -.05*** .11*** -.34***

6Feat

.16*** -.09*** .15***

.01

7Match -.16*** .19***
8Vic

5

----

.24*** .29***

.12*** .14***

--

.08*** .14***

--

.04**

-.05** -.00

-.00

-.00

.01

-.00

9AnxVic-.04**

.07*** .01

-.01

-.01

-.00

-.00

-.05***

--

10AnxInt .03

-.01*** .04**

.02

-.01

-.01

-.01

-.02

.01

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

75
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Outcome and Predictor Variables

Variable
Mean
SD
_______________________________
Criminality
3.65
1.90
Trust
2.62
1.53
Dominance
3.62
1.76
Feature
4.92
1.55
Match
.47
.50
Victim
.82
.39
AnxVic
2.82
1.22
AnxInt
3.48
1.07
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Table 4
Mean Trait Ratings and Number of Criminal Features by Conviction Status

Face Type
Criminality Dominance
Perpetrator
4.17 (1.86)
4.06 (1.79)
Exonerate
4.09 (1.95)
3.89 (1.75)
Filler
3.17 (1.76)
3.27 (1.68)
Note: SDs are shown in parentheses.

Trustworthiness
2.28 (1.39)
2.49 (1.51)
2.84 (1.57)

Features
5.62 (1.44)
5.61 (1.51)
4.20 (1.28)
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Figure 1
Baseline Model of Criminality Ratings
Note: This is a multilevel SEM diagram (Mehta, 2013) of the cross-classified regression
(Baayen, Davidson, Bates, 2008).
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Figure 2
Basic Model of Criminality Ratings
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Figure 3
Full Model of Criminality Ratings
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 5
Estimates for Baseline, Basic, and Full Models of Criminality

Criminality
Fixed Effects
Face Variables

Rater Variables

Variable
(Intercept)
Match
Features
Exonerate
Perpetrator
Victim
Anx-Victim
Anx-Interracial

Random Effects
RaterID
FaceID
Residual

Baseline
Basic Model
Full Model
Estimate Std. Error t value Estimate
Std. Error t value Estimate Std. Error t value
3.59
0.10 37.69
3.02
0.22 13.79
2.83
0.25 11.29
-0.80
0.13 -6.28
-0.80
0.13 -6.21
0.10
0.04 2.33
0.11
0.05 2.40
0.86
0.16 5.28
0.85
0.16 5.20
1.03
0.18 5.73
1.02
0.18 5.56
0.22
0.14 1.55
-0.06
0.04 -1.40
0.07
0.05 1.31
Variance Std.Dev.
Variance
Std.Dev.
Variance Std.Dev.
0.52
0.72
0.52
0.72
0.49
0.70
0.77
0.88
0.41
0.64
0.42
0.65
2.33
1.53
2.33
1.53
2.30
1.52
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Figure 4
Baseline Model of Dominance Ratings
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Figure 5
Basic Model of Dominance Ratings
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Figure 6
Full Model of Dominance Ratings
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 6
Estimates for Baseline, Basic, and Full Models of Dominance

Dominance
Fixed Effects
Face Variables

Rater Variables

Variable
(Intercept)
Match
Features
Exonerate
Perpetrator
Victim
Anx-Victim
Anx-Interracial

Random Effects
RaterID
FaceID
Residual

Baseline
Basic Model
Full Model
Estimate Std. Error t value Estimate
Std. Error t value Estimate Std. Error t value
3.62
0.08 45.21
2.86
0.17 16.81
2.82
0.22 12.99
0.22
0.10 2.33
0.27
0.10 2.79
0.07
0.03 2.19
0.08
0.03 2.32
0.49
0.12 3.99
0.49
0.12 3.97
0.70
0.14 5.15
0.66
0.14 4.83
0.02
0.16 0.14
0.01
0.05 0.29
0.06
0.06 1.13
Variance Std.Dev.
Variance
Std.Dev.
Variance Std.Dev.
0.63
0.80
0.64
0.80
0.65
0.81
0.38
0.61
0.22
0.46
0.22
0.47
2.12
1.46
2.12
1.46
2.08
1.44
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Figure 7
Baseline Model of Trustworthiness Ratings
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.

86

Figure 8
Basic Model of Trustworthiness Ratings
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Figure 9
Full Model of Trustworthiness Ratings
Note: These are unstandardized estimates.
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
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Table 7
Estimates for Baseline, Basic, and Full Models of Trustworthiness
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix A.1 Criminal Facial Feature Inventory
Male

Beady eyes

Shaggy hair

Small eyes

Long hair

Drooping eyes

Dark hair

Prominent chin

Scars

Protruding jaw

Pockmarks

Lowered eyebrows

Tattoos

Large ears

Facial hair

Flat nose

Dark pigmentation

Appendix A.2 Survey of Community Violence Exposure
1. How many times have you yourself actually been the victim of any type of violence such as
being beaten, mugged, raped, or attacked with a weapon? (circle only one)
(a) never

(d) 3 or 4 times

(g) at least once a month

(b) 1 time

(e) 5 or 6 times

(h) at least once a week

(c) 2 times

(f) 7 or 8 times

(i) almost every day

2. Who committed the violent act?
(a) someone of your own gender

(b) someone of a different gender

3. Who committed the violent act?
(a) someone of your own race

(b) someone of a different race

4. When was the last time this happened? (circle only one)
(a) about a week ago

(d) about 6 months ago

(g) between 1 and 2 years ago
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(b) about a month ago

(e) about 9 months ago

(h) between 3 and 5 years ago

(c) about 3 months ago

(f) about a year ago

(i) more than 5 years ago

5. How many times have you seen someone else being victimized by some form of violence such
as being beaten, mugged, raped, or attacked with a weapon?
(circle only one)
(a) never

(d) 3 or 4 times

(g) at least once a month

(b) 1 time

(e) 5 or 6 times

(h) at least once a week

(c) 2 times

(f) 7 or 8 times

(i) almost every day

6. Who committed the violent act?
(a) someone of your own gender

(b) someone of a different gender

7. Who committed the violent act?
(a) someone of your own race

(b) someone of a different race

8. When was the last time you saw this happen? (circle only one)
(a) about a week ago

(d) about 6 months ago

(g) between 1 and 2 years ago

(b) about a month ago

(e) about 9 months ago

(h) between 3 and 5 years ago

(c) about 3 months ago

(f) about a year ago

(i) more than 5 years ago

Appendix A.3 Anxiety about Violence Questionnaire
1. Do you ever carry a gun?
Never Occasionally Sometimes

Often Always

2. Do you feel anxious if you carry a gun?
Never

Occasionally

Sometimes

Often

Always

I never carry a gun

3. How concerned are you that you will be a victim of a violent crime?
Not at all

A little bit

Somewhat

Very

Always

4. How concerned are you that you will be a victim of a petty crime?
Not at all

Occasionally Somewhat

Very Always

91
5. Are you concerned about your personal safety with regard to terrorism?
Not at all

Occasionally Somewhat

Very Always

6. Do you ever feel threatened while on line?
Not at all

Occasionally Somewhat

Very Always

7. How often have you threatened others on line?
Never Rarely Occasionally

Often

Very Often

8. When you are interacting on line, how self-assured do you feel?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

9. When you are interacting face-to-face, how self-assured do you feel?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

10. How concerned are you that a gun may be used on you?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

11. How threatened do you feel when a police officer comes your direction in a low-crime
neighborhood?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

12. How threatened do you feel when a police officer comes your direction in a high-crime
neighborhood?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

13. How safe do you feel in neighborhoods where you are in the racial majority?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

14. How safe do you feel in neighborhoods where you are in the racial minority?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

15. How safe do you feel in the presence of police officers?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

16. How safe do you feel in the presence of police officers who are of your own race?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely
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17. How safe do you feel in the presence of police officers who are of a different race from
yours?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

How concerned are you for your own safety if you see a person with a concealed gun . . . ..
18. In a store?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

A little

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

Somewhat

Very much

Extremely

19. Walking past you on the street?
Not at all
20. In an office?
Not at all

21. In a retail store where you work?
Not at all

A little

Appendix A.4 Interracial Anxiety Scale
All items were rated on the following scale:
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

1. In the past, I have interacted with people of other races in many areas of my life (e.g., school,
friends, work, clubs).
2. The neighborhood(s) I grew up in had mostly people of my own race.
3. The high school I attended had mostly students of my own race.
4. In the past, I have rarely interacted with people of different races than my own.
5. In the past, my experiences with people from other races has been pleasant.
6. Over the course of my life, I have had many friends that were a different race than mine.
7. I have had many positive experiences with people from different races than my own.
8. I am confident that stereotypes don’t affect how I interact with people of different races.
9. Even if we hadn’t met before, a person of a different race would expect me to be prejudiced.
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10. When interacting with a person of a different race than mine, he or she would see me as prejudiced no matter what I did.
11. When interacting with a person of a different race than mine, I would be unsure how to act in
order to show him or her that I am not prejudiced.
12. Sometimes stereotypes come to my mind when interacting with a person of a different race,
even when I wish they wouldn’t.
13. If I were interacting with a person of another race, regardless of my behavior he or she would
interpret my behavior as prejudiced.
14. When interacting with a person of another race, I would imagine that he or she would be
watching my behavior closely for prejudice.
15. People of non-White races do not look for prejudice in White people’s behavior.
16. I am confident that I can respond without prejudice when interacting with a person of another
race.
17. Sometimes people of non-White races view normal behavior of Whites as prejudiced.
18. I would feel awkward when interacting with a person of a different race than mine.
19. I would feel uncomfortable when interacting with a person of a different race than mine.
20. When interacting with a person of another race, I would feel relaxed.
21. When interacting with a person of another race, I would feel nervous.
22. If I had a choice, I would rather not interact with people of different races than my own.
23. If I can avoid interacting with people of different races, I do.
24. I like interacting with people of different races than mine.
25. I would look forward to interacting with people of different races.
26. I would want to avoid interacting with people of different races.
27. I would find interacting with a person of a different race annoying.
28. I would be angry if I had to interact with a person of a different race than mine.
29. I would find interacting with a person of another race frustrating.
30. I would feel hostile when interacting with a person of another race.
31. Interacting with a person of another race would be irritating.

